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I. Introduction 
 Property tax reform has been given much attention recently in Georgia and 
throughout the U.S.  Among the possible reforms are various proposals to limit 
property taxes and property tax growth.  Therefore, a discussion of property tax 
limitations would seem to be useful.  This report discusses property tax limitations in 
the U.S. and highlights limitations imposed in Georgia.  We first provide an overview 
of property tax limitations and then discuss some important effects of property tax 
limitations.  We then give a brief discussion of how two specific limitation measures, 
assessment limits and levy limits, are administered across the states. 
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II. An Overview of Property Tax Limitations 
 This section provides a brief overview of property tax limitations.1  Property 
tax limitations fall into four basic categories:  
1. Full disclosure/truth in taxation provisions 
2. Limits on assessment increases 
3. Property tax rate limits 
4. Levy limits 
Some states also impose more general limitations on local governments by directly 
limiting increases in general revenue or general expenditures.  However, we do not 
treat general revenue or general expenditure limitations in this report.  We also do not 
discuss other property tax “relief” measures such as homestead exemptions and 
circuit breaker programs because they likely do not limit the aggregate level of 
property tax collections.2 
 
A. Full Disclosure 
 The first type of property tax limitation, full disclosure, is generally the least 
restrictive.  Full disclosure, sometimes referred to as truth in taxation provisions, 
typically require local governments to advertise information regarding the proposed 
tax rate and rollback rate in local newspapers, to hold public hearings to discuss the 
tax rates, and to vote on any tax rate that exceeds the rollback rate.  The rollback rate 
is the tax rate that yields the same amount of property tax revenue as in the previous 
year given the increase in assessed value but excluding new construction, 
improvements, and annexations from the increased assessed value.  The local 
legislative body must then vote in order to approve a tax rate that exceeds the 
rollback rate.  Full disclosure is designed to raise taxpayer awareness and 
participation  in  the  process  of  setting  the  property  tax rate process and to provide  
                                                          
1 This report is indebted to the work of Mullins and Cox (1995) and Mullins (2003).  
2 For a recent discussion of circuit breakers in other states and how a circuit breaker program 
could be structured in Georgia, see Winters (2008). 
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some constraint on the growth of property tax revenues.  However, in practice, local 
legislative bodies can generally override the rollback rate with only a simple majority 
vote, although a super-majority vote is required in some places.  Therefore, full 
disclosure is generally not very restrictive in terms of the property tax levy that local 
governments can impose.  However, the information provided by the tax rate setting 
process may result in a somewhat lower property tax rate. 
 
B. Assessment Limitations 
 Some states attempt to constrain property taxes by imposing limits on 
increases in assessed values.  These limits usually stipulate that annual increases in 
assessed value of a particular property cannot exceed a certain percentage unless the 
property is sold, transferred, or significantly altered.  (Alternatively, Iowa has 
imposed a limit on the increase in aggregate property values.)  If the property is sold 
or transferred other than to a spouse, the assessed value reverts back to one based on 
fair market value.  Alterations to property are added to the value at time of the 
alterations, but are then subject to the limitation on increases in assessed value.  
Because the assessment is largely based on the market value at the time the property 
was purchased, the term acquisition value system is used to describe the process as 
opposed to the more traditional fair market value system. Some assessment 
limitations apply only to homesteaded property while others apply to all property. In 
all states, the maximum increase is either some fixed percentage defined by statute or 
the lesser of some fixed percentage or inflation.  Assessment limits are often 
considered nonbinding in terms of the property tax levy because the limit can be 
circumvented through property tax rate increases.   
 Georgia currently has no statewide assessment limit.  However, homeowners 
age 62 and over with family income less than $30,000 are eligible to receive a 
floating homestead exemption for state and county taxes (but not school or municipal 
taxes).  This is a homestead exemption equal to the increase in assessed value, other 
than due to an expansion or renovation, since the property became eligible for the 
exemption.  The exemption is reset to zero when the property is sold or transferred 
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other than to a spouse.  Essentially, the floating homestead exemption has the effect 
of freezing the taxable value of the property.  In addition, 30 counties in Georgia have 
adopted floating homestead exemptions for county tax purposes for which all 
homesteaded property owners are eligible.  Floating homestead exemptions have also 
been adopted for a few cities and school districts in Georgia.  Similarly, Muscogee 
County has adopted a freeze on assessed value of homesteaded property for county, 
school, and municipal taxes until the property is sold or transferred. 
 
C. Tax Rate Limits 
 Property tax rate limits can apply either to the aggregate tax rate of all local 
governments or only to the tax rate of specific types of local governments (e.g. 
counties, municipalities, or school districts).  A majority of states adopting rate limits 
allow for the limit to be exceeded if approved by local voters.  County school systems 
in Georgia are subject to a rate limit of 20 mills, although the limit can be overridden 
with local voter approval.  Independent school systems are not subject to the rate 
limit.  In 2007, 29 of the 159 county school systems in Georgia had a property tax 
rate of 18 mills or more.  Of those, four had property tax rates exactly equal to 20 
mills and three had rates greater than 20 mills.3  Some counties and municipalities in 
Georgia are subject to other property tax rate limits, but there are no other statewide 
property tax rate limits.  Rate limits are more restrictive than limits on assessment 
increases, but are considered nonbinding in terms of property tax levy because the 
levy can increase through assessment increases.  However, if property tax rate limits 
are combined with limits on assessment increases, they have the potential to constrain 
property tax revenue growth. 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 The four county school systems with property tax rates equal to 20 mills are Clarke, Henry, 
Twiggs, and Wayne.  The three with rates greater than 20 mills are Rockdale (21.0 mills), DeKalb 
(22.9 mills), and Muscogee (23.37 mills). 
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D. Levy Limits 
 Property tax levy limits are generally the most stringent type of property tax 
limits.  Levy limits specify the maximum allowable annual increase in property tax 
revenue.  These limits apply to the aggregate property tax revenue from all property 
in a district and not to the revenue generated from individual properties.  Growth in 
the tax base from new construction, improvements, and annexations is usually 
excluded from the calculation of the allowable increase in the tax levy.  Levy limits 
are also subject to override by local voters in most states that have them.  Growth 
provisions vary significantly across states.  Some states have a maximum growth rate 
that is a fixed percent while other states tie the maximum growth rate to inflation, 
population growth, or tax base growth.   
Some states only restrict levy increases immediately after property is 
reassessed.  These are called revenue rollback limits (where reassessments are not 
done annually), and they are usually intended to prevent large tax increases following 
reassessment.  However, because such revenue rollback limits only apply following 
reassessment and can usually be overridden by voter approval, they are usually less 
binding than more general levy limits.  Some states also combine levy limits with 
other property tax limits.   
 In the next section, we discuss some general effects of property tax 
limitations.  Section 4 provides a survey of the states that have adopted assessment 
limits and how they are implemented.  Section 5 does the same for levy limits.  
Georgia already has a full disclosure provision and full disclosure laws do not vary 
much across the 22 states that have them, so not much would be gained from a 
detailed survey of full disclosure provisions across the states, and hence we do not 
provide one.4  We also do not provide a survey of the 37 states that have some form 
                                                          
4 The 22 states with full disclosure provisions are Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
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of property tax rate limit.5  Georgia already has a property tax rate limit for county 
school districts, so there is not much to be learned for Georgia from conducting a 
state by state description of property tax rate limits.  However, Georgia does not 
currently have a statewide assessment limit or levy limit, so a description of how 
other states use these limits would seem to be useful. 
  
                                                          
5  The 13 states without some form of property tax rate limit are Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia. 
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III. Effects of Property Tax Limitations 
 Property tax limitations vary in their effects because of differences in the 
extent to which they constrain property taxes.  As discussed above, full disclosure is 
generally not very constraining.  Rate limits and assessment limits are not binding by 
themselves but can be binding when combined.  Levy limits have the potential to be 
very binding, but that depends on how much growth is allowed.  There is a sizable 
literature that has explored the effects of property tax limitations.  Overall, this 
literature suggests that property tax limitations are associated with the following 
general effects on local fiscal structure: 
1. A general decline in property taxes as a percent of local total general 
revenue 
 
2. A modest decline in local own-source revenue as a percent of local total 
general revenue6   
 
3. An increased importance of state grants to local governments as a percent 
of local total general revenue, especially for school districts 
 
4. A decline in local general expenditures relative to state general 
expenditures 
 
5. An increased reliance on fees, charges, and miscellaneous revenue as a 
percentage of local total general revenue 
 
6. A modest increase in local sales taxes as a percentage of local total 
general revenue 
 
 However, limitations appear to have little to no affect on aggregate state plus 
local government expenditures.  Any reductions in revenue or expenditures at the 
local level are usually offset by increases at the state level.  These results can largely 
be explained by considering the rationale of voters who supported these limitations.  
Evidence suggests that voters were motivated by a desire for lower property taxes and 
more efficiency in government and not any desire for reduced public services (Sears 
                                                          
6 Local own-source revenue is simply all revenue raised by local governments except through 
grants from higher levels of government (i.e. federal and state grants). 
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and Citrin, 1982; Courant et al., 1985).  The result is that aggregate state and local 
public service levels are largely unaffected, but the financing of public services 
shifted from property taxes to other revenues sources.  More generally, expenditure 
and revenue responsibility has shifted from local to state governments. 
 Property tax limitations are also associated with significantly reduced 
autonomy for local governments.  Local governments are usually constrained in their 
ability to levy taxes other than property taxes, and grants from higher levels of 
governments are usually beyond the control of local entities.  There is valid concern 
that this reduced autonomy hinders the ability of local governments to satisfy the 
demands of their constituencies for public services (Mullins and Joyce, 1996).  The 
increased use of charges and miscellaneous revenue is in part a way to finance this 
demand.  However, charges and miscellaneous revenue are not viable options for 
financing public services that have significant spillovers such as police services, and 
leave little room for redistribution at the local level.   
 Mullins (2004) suggests that the effect of limitations varies across 
jurisdictions and often in undesirable ways.  Limitations are associated with increased 
variation in expenditures across local jurisdictions, including school districts.  The 
result is increased disparities in service levels.  Even more troubling, jurisdictions in 
declining urban cores and those with less prosperous populations are the ones most 
constrained by local limitations.  Local limitations adversely affect the ability of local 
governments to provide services to those who are the most disadvantaged.   
 Additionally, assessment limits have some unique effects that are worth 
mentioning.  For states with assessment limits, property is usually reassessed at full 
market value upon sale of the property, so that the benefit of assessment limits 
increases with length of time the property is owned.  An important result is that the 
tax paid by two nearly identical properties can be substantially different even if they 
are next door to each other.  More generally, assessment limits can lead to 
tremendous divergence in effective property tax rates for property owners within a 
district.  Essentially, assessment limitations that apply to all property shift the 
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property tax burden from those who have owned the property for a long time to 
recent buyers. 
 For example, California’s Proposition 13 established an acquisition value 
property tax system that set assessed values at the 1975-76 market values and only 
allowed annual increases in assessed value of 2 percent unless the property is sold or 
significantly modified.  The increase in market values has generally been much 
greater than 2 percent, so that tremendous disparities in property tax burdens have 
emerged, even within districts.  O’Sullivan et al (1995) report that by 1991, taxes on 
newly purchased property in Los Angeles County were more than five times the taxes 
paid on property of equal market value owned since 1975.   
 In Georgia, Muscogee County has established an acquisition value system 
that took effect in 1983, whereby appraised values on homesteaded property for local 
property taxes are frozen at the acquisition value or at the 1983 value if purchased 
before then.  The result has been disparities in tax burdens for otherwise similar 
properties (Sjoquist and Pandey, 1999).  The disparities are not as large as those 
reported by O’Sullivan et al (1995) for California, but are quite significant 
nonetheless.  The floating homestead exemptions adopted more recently in several 
other counties are likely to have similar results over time. 
 Assessment limits also lead to potential lock-in effects, since moving from a 
property held for a long time potentially results in a large increase in property taxes.  
Evidence from California suggests that this has reduced housing turnover.  And 
stories from Florida imply that the lock-in effect was a major reason Florida reformed 
its assessment limitation policy.   
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IV. Property Tax Assessment Limits across the States 
 Property tax assessment limits are imposed statewide in 12 states.7  In 
addition to these state-wide limitations, limitations on the growth in assessed value 
have been adopted for a number of sub-state governments.  For example, there is an 
assessment limit in New York City and in Nassau County, New York.  In Georgia 
there is a freeze on assessed values for homesteaded property in Muscogee County.  
In this section, we briefly discuss statewide assessment limits across the states.8 
 
A. Arizona 
 Arizona adopted an assessment increase limit in 1980. The system works as 
follows.  Each parcel of property has two separate values, a fair market value (FMV) 
and a Limited Property Value (LPV). The statutory annual growth limit for the LPV 
is the greater of 10 percent and 25 percent of the difference between last year’s LPV 
and this year’s FMV. (In no case can the LPV exceed fair market value.) To illustrate, 
consider a house with a LPV of $50,000 in 2006 and a FMV of $60,000 in 2007. A 
10 percent increase in LPV would be $5,000, while 25 percent of the difference 
between $50,000 and $60,000 would be $2,500. Thus, the LPV for 2007 would be 
$55,000, which equals $50,000 plus the greater of $5,000 and $2,500. If in 2008, the 
FMV is $85,000, then the LPV for 2008 would be $62,500, i.e., $55,000 plus the 
greater of 10 percent (i.e., $5,500), and 25 percent of the difference between $85,000 
and $55,000 (i.e., $7,500).  Although Arizona has a limitation on assessment 
increases, it does not have an acquisition value assessment system.  Instead of basing 
taxes on market value in the event of new construction, improvements, or change in 
use or ownership, the LPV for such property is recalculated based on the ratio of LPV 
to FMV for like properties in the surrounding geographic area. This ratio is then 
applied to the property's FMV to find the LPV. 
                                                          
7 The state of Washington approved Initiative 722 in 2000 that would have limited annual 
assessment increases to the lesser of 2 percent or inflation.  However, I-722 was declared 
unconstitutional by the state Supreme Court before being implemented. 
8 This discussion relies in part on Sjoquist and Pandey (1999) and Baer (2003). 
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B. Arkansas 
 Since 2001, increases in assessed value for homesteaded property in Arkansas 
cannot increase by more than 5 percent per year.  Furthermore, assessed values are 
frozen on homesteaded property owned by persons who are disabled or age 65 or 
over.  Assessments increases on non-homesteaded property are limited to 10 percent 
per year.  These limits do not apply to substantial additions and improvements to real 
property. 
 
C. California 
 California adopted a property tax assessment limitation as part of Proposition 
13, which was passed by referendum in June 1978. California’s limitation is the most 
widely cited, largely because of the breadth of the provisions contained in Proposition 
13 and because it applies to all types of property, not just homesteaded property. It is 
one of the few limitations to be studied in much detail. Proposition 13 contained four 
key provisions:  
● The property tax rate on any parcel cannot exceed 1 percent. (This means 
that millage rates applied by all local governments on a particular parcel 
cannot sum to more than 10 mills.); 
 
● The assessed value of all property was “rolled back” to its 1975-76 value; 
 
● The assessed value of any property can increase by no more than 2 
percent per year; 
 
● If the ownership of the property changes, the property is re-assessed to its 
market value, i.e., its purchase price. (Various exceptions have been 
adopted over time, e.g., a transfer within a family does not result in a re-
assessment.). 
 
 The third provision essentially froze the assessed value of property since the 
increase in fair market value has usually far exceeded 2 percent per year in 
California. The third and fourth provisions have lead to the use of the term 
“acquisition value assessment.” In essence, the assessed value of a property (except 
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for the allowable 2 percent annual increase) equals the value of the property at the 
time the owner purchased it. 
 
D. Florida 
 Florida's assessment limitation, known as the “Save Our Homes 
Amendment,” was passed in 1992 and took effect in 1995.  The constitutional 
amendment restricts increases in assessed values for homesteaded properties to the 
lower of 3 percent or the rate of inflation based on changes in the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI).  Increases in value from new construction and additions are excluded 
from the assessment limit.  However, under the original amendment when 
homesteaders moved, they often experienced large increases in property taxes.  The 
system thus discouraged mobility.  As a result, Floridians began calling for 
“Portability of Save Our Homes” and passed another constitutional amendment on 
January 29, 2008 to be retroactively effective as of January 1, 2008.   
 The amendment basically allows Floridians with a previous homestead to 
transfer up to $500,000 of the difference between the assessed value and market value 
to a new homestead within two years when the new homestead has a market value 
greater than or equal to that of the previous homestead (moving up).  When the new 
homestead has a lower market value than the previous homestead (moving down), the 
assessed value for the new homestead is computed as the same percentage of market 
value as was the case in the previous property, provided that the difference between 
the market value and assessed value of the new homestead does not exceed $500,000.  
Once the assessed value of the new homestead is established, it cannot increase by 
more than 3 percent per year or the rate of inflation. 
 A couple of examples may help illustrate.  Suppose a Floridian moves up by 
selling a home with a market value of $200,000 and an assessed value of $100,000 
and establishing a new homestead with a market value of $400,000.  The assessed 
value of the new homestead equals the market value less the difference between the 
market value and assessed value for the previous homestead, so the assessed value 
equals $300,000 [$400,000 – ($200,000 - $100,000)].  Alternatively, suppose he or 
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she moves down from a homestead with a market value of $200,000 and an assessed 
value of $100,000 to a homestead with a market value of $150,000.  The new 
assessed value will be $75,000 [$150,000*0.5]. 
 
E. Iowa 
 Iowa has an approach to limiting assessment growth that differs from other 
states. The Iowa statute limits the growth of total assessed value in the state to 4 
percent per year. The limit originally was set at 6 percent in 1978, but was lowered to 
4 percent in 1980. New construction and improvements are excluded; utility property 
is limited to 8 percent annual growth. 
 To limit the growth in assessment, the state imposes a mandatory assessment 
ratio called a “rollback percentage” that ensures that the total assessed value in Iowa 
is at most 4 percent greater than the previous year. Taxable value for a parcel is equal 
to the parcel’s market value times the applicable rollback percentage. Separate 
rollback percentages are calculated for each class of property: agricultural, 
residential, commercial, industrial, utility, and railroads. The rollback percentage for 
residential property and agricultural property is further limited to the smaller of the 
increase in value of residential and agricultural property if either increases by less 
than 4 percent. Since the increase in agricultural property value (which is not assessed 
at market value) has generally been much less than 4 percent, the effective limitation 
on residential property has been less than 4 percent. 
 This system means that all parcels within a given property category are 
assessed at the same percentage of market value. Consider the following example, 
suppose two parcels are initially worth $100,000, but one increases in value by 50 
percent while the other experiences no increase. In other states, if the assessment cap 
was 4 percent, the two parcels would be assessed at $104,000 and $100,000, 
respectively, which would be 69.3 percent and 100 percent of market value. In Iowa, 
the two parcels would be assessed at a total of $208,000, and each parcel would be 
assessed at 83.2 percent of market value, where 83.2 percent equals 
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(208,000/250,000)*100. Thus, the two parcels would be assessed at $124,800 and 
$83,200, respectively. 
 
F. Maryland 
 Maryland originally adopted an assessment increase limitation in 1959, but 
the statute was amended in 1991. The assessment limitation applies only to 
homesteaded property and varies by type of government. Assessment increases for 
state government property taxes are limited to 10 percent per year. County and 
municipal governments are allowed to cap the increase in assessed value at a rate less 
than 10 percent if they so desire, i.e., they can choose a limitation between 0 and 10 
percent. There is no limitation imposed on assessment increases for school districts. 
 
G. Michigan 
 Proposal A, passed in 1994, constitutionally limits the annual increase in 
taxable value for a property to the lesser of 5 percent or inflation (as measured by the 
Consumer Price Index).  The limit excludes additions to property.  When sold or 
transferred, property is reassessed at 50 percent of true cash value. 
 
H. New Mexico 
 In 2001 New Mexico strengthened a previous assessment limit enacted in 
1979.   Increases in assessed value for a residential property are limited to 3 percent 
per year.  However, counties where the ratio of assessed values to sales prices is less 
than 85 percent can increase assessments up to 5 percent per year.  In addition, 
assessed values are frozen for homesteaders age 65 and over whose annual household 
income is $18,000 or less.  These limitations do not apply to substantial 
improvements to property, and property is reassessed after a change in ownership. 
 
I. Oklahoma 
 Oklahoma passed an assessment limit that became effective in 1997.  
Residential assessment increases are limited to 5 percent per year.  Oklahoma also 
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implemented a freeze on assessed values for homesteaded property owned by persons 
age 65 and over with household income of $25,000 or less.  The limits exclude 
improvements, and property is reassessed after being sold or transferred. 
 
J. Oregon 
 Under Oregon’s Measure 50, which clarified and replaced Measure 47, 
assessed values for all property in 1997-1998 were rolled back to the 1995-1996 level 
less 10 percent.  Since then the assessed value for an individual property cannot 
increase by more than 3 percent per year.  This limit does not apply to new 
construction, major improvements, or subdivision of property but does apply to all 
types of property (residential, commercial, industrial, etc.).  Oregon is also unique in 
that property is not reassessed upon sale or transfer unless significantly altered.   
 
K. South Carolina 
 South Carolina passed an assessment limit that became effective in 2007.  
Increases in assessed values for individual properties are limited to 15 percent over 5 
years (i.e. an average of 3 percent per year).  The limit excludes additions and 
improvements, and property is reassessed at its fair market value upon transfer of 
ownership. 
 
L. Texas 
 Texas voters in November 1997 approved a limitation on assessment 
increases. The increase in assessed value of homesteaded property is limited to 10 
percent per year plus increases in value due to improvements. The assessed value 
reverts back to market value if the property is sold. However, the limitation is 
portable for homeowners over 65 years of age; if an elderly homeowner moves, the 
assessed value of the new person’s home will be the same percentage of the market 
value as was the original home. The legislation provides no mechanism for correcting 
for prior appraisal errors, thus locking in such errors. 
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V. Property Tax Levy Limits across the States 
 Property tax levy limits are imposed in some form in 27 states.9  However, 
levy limits vary a good deal across states.  In this section, we provide a brief 
discussion of the levy limits across states.10 
 
A. Alaska 
 Adopted in 1972, the levy limit in Alaska applies only to municipalities and 
for operating expenses.  It limits annual revenues in a municipality to $1500 per 
resident.  Additionally, the property tax levy cannot exceed 225 percent of per capita 
assessed full and true value of property in the state multiplied by the number of 
residents in the municipality. 
 
B. Arizona 
 Adopted in 1913 and amended in 1980, Arizona’s levy limit applies only to 
counties, municipalities, and community college districts.  For each of these 
jurisdictions, a maximum allowable annual levy has been set and increases by 2 
percent per year plus an adjustment for new construction.  Therefore, jurisdictions at 
the levy limit can only increase property tax revenues by 2 percent annually 
(excluding new construction), but jurisdictions below the maximum can increase 
revenues by more than 2 percent up to the levy limit. 
 
C. Arkansas 
 Arkansas’ levy limit is a rollback provision that applies to counties, 
municipalities, and school districts.  It stipulates that if countywide reassessment 
results in a 10 percent or more increase in property values, rates are rolled back so 
that no local government receives revenue growth greater than 10 percent.   
                                                          
9 Additionally, Kansas and Utah previously had levy limits, but they were repealed in 1999 and 
1986 respectively. 
10 This discussion borrows from Mullins and Cox (1995) and Baer (2003). 
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D. Colorado 
 Colorado has both a statutory and a constitutional levy limit with whichever 
is more restrictive taking effect.  The statutory limit was adopted in 1913 and 
amended in 1976 and 1987.  The statutory provision limits annual property tax 
revenue increases for counties and non-home rule municipalities to 5.5 percent 
excluding new construction, improvements, annexations, and debt service.  The 
constitutional limit (TABOR) adopted in 1992 restricts annual levy increases for each 
local government to the inflation rate plus annual “local growth”, with adjustments 
for revenue changes approved by voters.  For non-school districts, local growth is 
defined as the percentage change in taxable property values due to new construction.  
For school districts, local growth is defined as the percentage change in student 
enrollment. 
 
E. Delaware 
Delaware’s levy limit is a rollback provision that stipulates that property tax 
revenues cannot increase by more than 15 percent for counties and 10 percent for 
school districts following a countywide reassessment.  This is essentially a mandated 
partial roll back of the property tax rate following a reassessment of all property. 
 
F. Idaho 
 Idaho limits levy increases for counties, municipalities, and school districts to 
3 percent annually plus an adjustment for new construction and annexations.  Voters 
can approve increases beyond the 3 percent. 
 
G. Illinois 
 Illinois limits levy increases for certain jurisdictions in the Chicago 
metropolitan area to the lesser of 5 percent or the inflation rate, excluding new 
construction, annexed property and bonded debt.  Voters can approve increases 
beyond this amount. 
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H. Indiana 
 Since 2003, Indiana local jurisdictions cannot increase property tax revenues 
at a rate greater than the six-year average growth of non-farm personal income in 
Indiana.  Local governments can appeal the limit if total assessed value growth 
exceeds the statewide assessed value growth by 3 percent or more.  They can also 
raise property taxes above the limit for a variety of reasons including rising public 
pension payments. 
 
I. Kentucky 
 Kentucky has a rollback provision that property tax rates must be adjusted 
annually to limit revenue growth to 4 percent, excluding growth from new property.  
If revenue increases by more than 4 percent, voters may hold a referendum to 
reconsider the rate. 
 
J. Louisiana 
 Louisiana has a rollback provision that property tax rates must be adjusted 
after reassessment to yield the same amount of revenue as in the previous year 
excluding increases for additions and improvements.  Property tax rates may be 
raised with voter approval.   
 
K. Massachusetts 
 Adopted in 1980 and amended in 1983, Massachusetts’ levy limit stipulates 
that local taxing districts’ allowable levy for a year cannot increase by more than 2.5 
percent of the maximum allowable levy for the previous year plus an adjustment for 
new property.  However, the levy limit can be exceeded by overrides approved by 
voters. 
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L. Michigan 
 Michigan has a rollback provision.  Following a reassessment, local property 
tax rates must be reduced so that total property taxes, other than that attributable to 
new property, do not increase by more than the inflation rate.  The limit can be 
overridden with voter approval and does not apply to debt service. 
 
M. Mississippi 
 In Mississippi, property taxes for local taxing districts are limited to increases 
of 10 percent over the largest amount collected over the last three years, excluding 
increases due to new property.  Other exclusions for debt service and certain special 
functions exist as well.  Voters can approve property taxes above this limit. 
 
N. Missouri 
 Missouri has a rollback provision.  If total assessed value increases by more 
than 5 percent or the inflation rate, tax rates must be reduced so that property tax 
revenues increase by no more than the lesser of 5 percent or the rate of inflation.  The 
limit excludes revenue increase due to new property and does not apply to bonded 
debt.  Additionally, voters may approve levy increases above the limit.   
 
O. Montana 
 Counties and cities in Montana can increase total property tax revenues by no 
more than one half of the average inflation rate for the previous three years, 
excluding increases due to new construction.  The limit can be exceeded with voter 
approval and for certain emergencies.   
 
P. Nebraska 
 Counties and municipalities in Nebraska are limited to annual increases in 
property taxes of 5 percent.  The limit excludes debt service and can be exceeded 
with voter approval. 
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Q. Nevada 
 Nevada limits counties and municipalities to property tax increases of no 
more than 6 percent per year excluding increases from new property.  The limit also 
does not apply to bonded debt and certain capital improvement projects.  
 
R. New Jersey 
 New Jersey passed a levy limit in 2007 which imposes a 4 percent cap on 
property tax increases of local governments.  The limit provides exceptions for new 
construction and debt service.  Additionally, local governments can exceed the 4 
percent cap with voter approval.  
 
S. New Mexico 
 New Mexico limits property tax increases for counties, municipalities, and 
school districts to the lesser of 5 percent or the inflation rate, excluding increases due 
to new property and levies for debt service.   
 
T. North Dakota 
 Local governments in North Dakota cannot collect property taxes greater than 
the highest amount collected in the previous three years, excluding increases due to 
new property.  The limit does not apply to revenues for bonded debt or certain capital 
projects and voters can approve revenues above the limit.   
 
U. Ohio 
 Local governments in Ohio for which total local property taxes for all taxing 
units exceed 1 percent of true market value must roll back tax rates following 
reassessment so that property tax revenues do not exceed the previous amount.  This 
limit does not apply to new property or bonded debt and may be exceeded by voter 
referendum. 
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V. Oregon 
 Oregon’s Measure 50, limits the annual increase in property taxes to 3 
percent, excluding levies for bonded debt and increases in value due to additions or 
rezoning.  The limit can be exceeded with voter approval.   
 
W. Pennsylvania 
 Pennsylvania has a rollback provision with different limitations for different 
local governments.  Following reassessment, aggregate property taxes cannot 
increase by more than 5 percent or 10 percent, depending on the type of local 
government.  In addition, aggregate property taxes for some school districts cannot 
increase by more than the percentage change in statewide average weekly wages from 
the previous year.  The limit excludes increases due to new property and can be 
overridden by voter referendum. 
 
X. Rhode Island 
 Local governments in Rhode Island are limited to annual increases in 
property taxes of 5.25 percent in 2008.  However, the limit is scheduled to be 
gradually reduced to 4 percent by 2013.  Localities may approve an override with a 
four-fifths vote of the local governing body.  
 
Y. South Dakota 
 Counties and municipalities in South Dakota cannot annually increase 
property taxes by more than the lesser of 3 percent or the inflation rate.  The limit 
excludes growth from new construction and can be exceeded with voter approval. 
 
Z. Texas 
 Texas has a rollback provision.  Following reassessment, local governments 
must roll back property tax rates to yield revenue increases no greater than 8 percent, 
excluding revenues for debt service.  If revenue growth exceeds 8 percent, voters can 
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petition for a referendum to roll back rates to result in an 8 percent increase in 
revenues.   
 
AA. Washington 
 Under a levy limit adopted in 2001, counties and municipalities in the state of 
Washington cannot increase property tax revenues annually by more than the lesser 
of 1 percent or the inflation rate.  This limit excludes increases for new construction 
and bonded debt.  The limit can also be exceeded with voter approval. 
 
BB. West Virginia 
 West Virginia has a rollback provision according to which property tax rates 
must be adjusted following a reassessment so that levies for each county and 
municipal government cannot increase by more than 3 percent annually.  This limit 
does not apply to bonded debt or new property.  Additionally, counties and 
municipalities can hold public hearings to increase property tax revenues by up to 12 
percent annually. 
 
Property Tax Limitations 
 
23 
 
References 
 
Baer, David (2003). “State Programs and Practices for Reducing Residential Property 
Taxes.” AARP. http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/2003_04_taxes.pdf.  
 
Courant, Paul, Edward Gramlich, and Daniel Rubinfield (1985). “Why Voters 
Support Tax Limitations: The Michigan Case.” National Tax Journal 38(1). 
 
Mullins, Daniel R. (2003). “Popular Processes and the Transformation of State and 
Local Government Finance.” In David L. Sjoquist (ed.), State and Local 
Finances under Pressure. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
 
Mullins, Daniel R. (2004). “Tax and Expenditure Limitations and the Fiscal 
Response of Local Government: Asymmetric Intra-Local Fiscal Effects.” 
Public Budgeting and Finance  24(4). http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/ 
Reports/information/M-194.pdf. 
 
Mullins, Daniel R. and Kimberly A. Cox (1995). Tax and Expenditure Limits on 
Local \Governments. M-194. Washington, DC: Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations. 
 
Mullins, Daniel R. and Philip G. Joyce (1996). “Tax and Expenditure Limitations and 
State and Local Fiscal Structure: An Empirical Assessment.” Public 
Budgeting and Finance 16(1). 
 
O’Sullivan, Arthur, Terri A. Sexton, and Steven M. Sheffrin (1995). Property Taxes 
& Tax Revolts: The Legacy of Proposition 13. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Sears, David O. and Jack Citrin (1982). Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in 
California. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Sjoquist, David L. and Lakshmi Pandey (1999). “Limitations on Increases in Property 
Tax Assessed Value.” FRP Report No. 37, November. 
 
Winters, John V. (2008). “A Targeted Property Tax Relief Program for Georgia.” 
FRC Report No. 173, February. 
 
 
Property Tax Limitations 
 
24 
 
About the Authors 
John V. Winters is a research associate in the Fiscal Research Center of the 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University and is currently 
finishing his Ph.D. in Economics.  His research interests include state and local 
public finance, urban and regional economics, and the economics of education.  John 
Winters is from Mississippi and holds a B.A. in economics from Mississippi State 
University and a M.A. in economics from Georgia State University. 
 
 
About The Fiscal Research Center 
 
 The Fiscal Research Center provides nonpartisan research, technical 
assistance, and education in the evaluation and design of state and local fiscal and 
economic policy, including both tax and expenditure issues.  The Center’s mission is 
to promote development of sound public policy and public understanding of issues of 
concern to state and local governments. 
 The Fiscal Research Center (FRC) was established in 1995 in order to 
provide a stronger research foundation for setting fiscal policy for state and local 
governments and for better-informed decision making.  The FRC, one of several 
prominent policy research centers and academic departments housed in the School of 
Policy Studies, has a full-time staff and affiliated faculty from throughout Georgia 
State University and elsewhere who lead the research efforts in many organized 
projects. 
 The FRC maintains a position of neutrality on public policy issues in order to 
safeguard the academic freedom of authors.  Thus, interpretations or conclusions in 
FRC publications should be understood to be solely those of the author. 
Property Tax Limitations 
 
25 
 
FISCAL RESEARCH CENTER STAFF 
David L. Sjoquist, Director and Professor of Economics 
Peter Bluestone, Research Associate 
Robert Buschman, Research Associate 
Margo Doers, Administrative Coordinator 
Nevbahar Ertas, Research Associate 
Jaiwan M. Harris, Business Manager 
Kenneth J. Heaghney, State Fiscal Economist 
Stacie Kershner, Program Coordinator 
Jungbu Kim, Research Associate 
John W. Matthews, Senior Research Associate 
Nara Monkam, Research Associate 
Lakshmi Pandey, Senior Research Associate 
Dana K. Rickman, Senior Research Associate 
Dorie Taylor, Assistant Director 
Arthur D. Turner, Microcomputer Software Technical Specialist 
Sean Turner, Research Associate 
Sally Wallace, Associate Director and Professor of Economics 
Laura A. Wheeler, Senior Research Associate 
Tumika Williams, Staff Assistant 
John Winters, Research Associate 
 
 
ASSOCIATED GSU FACULTY 
James Alm, Dean and Professor of Economics 
Roy W. Bahl, Regents’ Professor of Economics 
Spencer Banzhaf, Associate Professor of Economics 
Carolyn Bourdeaux, Assistant Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies 
Martin F. Grace, Professor of Risk Management and Insurance 
Shiferaw Gurmu, Associate Professor of Economics 
Gregory B. Lewis, Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies 
Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez, Professor of Economics 
Theodore H. Poister, Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies 
David P. Richardson, Professor of Risk Management and Insurance 
Jonathan C. Rork, Assistant Professor of Economics 
Bruce A. Seaman, Associate Professor of Economics 
Erdal Tekin, Assistant Professor of Economics 
Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Professor of Economics 
Mary Beth Walker, Associate Professor of Economics 
Katherine G. Willoughby, Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies 
 
 
PRINCIPAL ASSOCIATES 
Richard M. Bird, University of Toronto   Douglas Krupka, IZA, Bonn Germany 
David Boldt, State University of West Georgia   Jack Morton, Morton Consulting Group 
Gary Cornia, Brigham Young University   Glenwood Ross, Morehouse College 
Kelly D. Edmiston, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Ross H. Rubenstein, Syracuse University 
Robert Eger, Florida State University   Michael J. Rushton, Indiana University 
Alan Essig, Georgia Budget and Policy Institute  Rob Salvino, Coastal Carolina University 
Dagney G. Faulk, Indiana University Southeast  Edward Sennoga, Makerere University, Uganda 
Catherine Freeman, U.S. Department of Education  William J. Smith, West Georgia College 
Joshua L. Hart, Carnegie Mellon University   Robert P. Strauss, Carnegie Mellon University 
Richard R. Hawkins, University of West Florida  Jeanie J. Thomas, Consultant 
Gary Henry, University of North Carolina/Chapel Hill  Kathleen Thomas, Mississippi State University 
Julie Hotchkiss, Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank   Thomas L. Weyandt, Atlanta Regional Commission 
Mary Mathewes Kassis, State University of West Georgia Matthew Wooten, University of Georgia 
Property Tax Limitations 
 
26 
 
RECENT PUBLICATIONS 
(All publications listed are available at http://frc.aysps.gsu.edu or call the Fiscal Research Center at 
404/413-0249, or fax us at 404/413-0248.) 
 
Property Tax Limitations (John V. Winters)  This report discusses property tax 
limitations in the U.S. and highlights limitations imposed in Georgia.  FRC Report 
179 (June 2008) 
 
An Analysis of a Need-Based Student Aid Program for Georgia (Nara Monkam, 
Lakshmi Pandey, Dana K. Rickman and David L. Sjoquist)  This report explores 
issues associated with establishing a need-based student aid program in Georgia.  
FRC Report/Brief 178 (May 2008) 
 
A Closer Look at Georgia’s Veteran Population (Jonathan C. Rork)  This brief 
compares demographic information on Georgia's veteran population with that of the 
rest of the country.  FRC Brief 177 (May 2008) 
 
Tracking the Economy of the City of Atlanta:  Past Trends and Future Prospects 
(Glenwood Ross, David L. Sjoquist, and Matthew Wooten)  This report explores 
the changes in the level and composition of employment in the City of Atlanta over 
the last 25 years.  FRC Report 176 (May 2008) 
 
Georgia’s Immigrants:  Past, Present, and Future (Douglas J. Krupka and John 
V. Winters)  This report examines the economic success of immigrants relative to the 
state’s residents as a whole and speculates on how we might expect immigrant 
populations to fare in the future.  FRC Report/Brief 175 (April 2008) 
 
Property Tax in Georgia (David L. Sjoquist and John V. Winters)  This report 
discusses the structure of the property tax in Georgia and various provisions that 
make up the structure of the property tax.  FRC Report 174 (March 2008) 
 
A Targeted Property Tax Relief Program for Georgia (John V. Winters)  This 
report describes how a targeted property tax relief program could be designed and 
provides estimates of the cost and distribution of program benefits.  FRC Report 173 
(February 2008) 
 
A Historical Comparison of Neighboring States with Different Income Tax 
Regimes (Peter Bluestone)  This report focuses on simple historical differences 
between states without an income tax and neighbor states with an income tax.  FRC 
Report 172 (November 2007) 
 
Replacing All Property Taxes:  An Analysis of Revenue Issues (John Matthews 
and David L. Sjoquist) This brief discusses the amount of revenue needed to replace 
all property taxes in Georgia.  FRC Brief 171 (October 2007) 
 
Property Tax Limitations 
 
27 
 
Revenue Estimates for Eliminating Sales Tax Exemptions and Adding Services to 
the Sales Tax Base (John Matthews, David L. Sjoquist and John Winters) This 
report provides revenue estimates for alternative combination of eliminating sales tax 
exemptions and adding services to the sales tax base.  FRC Report 170 (October 
2007) 
 
Report on the City of South Fulton:  Potential Revenue and Expenditures (Revised) 
(Robert J. Eger III and John Matthews)  This report evaluates the fiscal 
consequences of incorporating a new city of South Fulton, using Fulton County 
revenue and expenditure data and benchmarks from other Georgia cities.  FRC 
Report/Brief 169 (October 2007) 
 
Report on the City of Chattahoochee Hill Country:  Potential Revenues and 
Expenditures (Robert J. Eger III and John Matthews)  Using Fulton County 
revenue and expenditure data and benchmarks developed from other Georgia city 
data, this report evaluates the fiscal consequences of incorporating a new city of 
Chattahoochee Hill Country.  FRC Report/Brief 168 (October 2007) 
 
Selected Fiscal and Economic Implications of Aging (David L. Sjoquist, Sally 
Wallace and John Winters) This report considers pressures and potential benefits of 
an increased elderly population in Georgia.  FRC Report 167 (October 2007) 
 
Subnational Value-Added Taxes:  Options for Georgia (Laura Wheeler and Nara 
Monkam) This report considers the implications of levying a subnational value-
added tax in Georgia as a replacement for the state corporate income and sales tax.   
FRC Report/Brief 166 (September 2007) 
 
Revenue Sources of State and Local Governments  (Nikola Tasić) This brief 
compares the reliance on various revenue sources across Georgia compared with 
eight other states.  FRC Report/Brief 165 (September 2007) 
 
Tax Revenue Stability of Replacing the Property Tax with a Sales Tax.  (John 
Winters) This policy brief discusses the implications for tax revenue stability of 
proposals that would replace the property tax with an increased sales tax.  FRC Brief 
164 (September 2007) 
 
Potential Impact of the Great Plan on Georgia’s Tax Administration.  (John 
Matthews) This brief examines local property tax and sales tax implications for tax 
administrators.  FRC Brief 163 (August 2007) 
 
 
 
(All publications listed are available at http://frc.gsu.edu or call the Fiscal Research Center at 
404/413-0249, or fax us at 404/413-0248.) 
 
